Of all scienti c investigations into reasoning with uncertainty and chance, probability theory is perhaps the best understood paradigm. Nevertheless, all studies conducted thus far into the semantics of quantitative logic programming(cf. 29, 30, 31] ) have restricted themselves to non-probabilistic semantical characterizations. In this paper, we take a few steps towards rectifying this situation. We de ne a logic programming language that is syntactically similar to the annotated logics of 5, 6], but in which the truth values are interpreted probabilistically. A probabilistic model theory and xpoint theory is developed for such programs. This probabilistic model theory satis es the requirements proposed by Fenstad 16] for a function to be called probabilistic. The logical treatment of probabilities is complicated by two facts:
Introduction
This scenario has been described to demonstrate that reasoning about probabilistic and statistical information is common in many real life situations (for numerous examples on the applications of probability theory to human reasoning, see Gnedenko and Khinchin 23] ). Often, such probabilistic information is used in decisions made automatically (without human intervention) by computer programs. Thus, automated reasoning systems need to know how to reason with probabilistic information.
Despite the fact that quantitative logic programming has been studied intensely (cf. the works of van Emden 51], Shapiro 46 ], Fitting 18, 19] , Blair and Subrahmanian 5, 6], Kifer et al 29, 32] and Morishita 39] ), no probabilistic foundation for multivalued logic programming has been developed thus far. There is no doubt that probability theory is the most widely accepted formalism for reasoning about chance and uncertainty. As logic programs are a natural formalism for designing rule based expert systems, it is of vital importance that they have the ability to reason with probabilistic information. The main aim of this paper is to propose and semantically characterize such a logic programming language.
In brief, the principal contributions of this paper are:
1. to design a logical framework within which probabilistic information can be easily expressed. This is done by extending the annotated logics introduced by Blair and Subrahmanian 5, 48, 50] to allow (i) conjunctions and disjunctions to be annotated and (ii) to allow annotations to be closed intervals of truth values.
2. to study the semantics of this language, and to clearly understand the relationships between probability theory, model theory, xpoint theory and proof theory for such languages.
3. In particular, we show that the model-theoretic framework developed here satis es the criteria proposed by Fenstad 16] for a function to be called probabilistic. 4 . some complications that arise in 2) above are that even sets of de nite-clause-like formulas may be inconsistent in a probabilistic sense. For instance, the probabilistic statement: \The probability of event E lies in the range 0:2; 0; 3]" is inconsistent with the probabilistic statement: \the probability of E lies in the range 0:5; 0:6]". Our model theory appropriately handles such probabilistic phenomena.
5. we develop a query processing procedure for handling queries to such programs. The procedure is complicated by the fact that uni cation of conjunctions and disjunctions of atoms does not proceed in the classical way, and that mgu's may not be unique.
Syntax
Let L be a xed rst order language containing in nitely many variable symbols, and nitely many constant and predicate symbols, but no function symbols 1 , and let B L be the Herbrand 1 The technical reason why function symbols are not supported will be clari ed later.
base of L. Thus, B L is always nite.
De nition 1 i) conj(B L ) = fA 1^: : :^A n jn 1 is an integer and A 1 ; : : :; A n 2 B L and 81 i; j n; i 6 = j ) A i 6 = A j g ii) disj(B L ) = fA 1 _ : : : _ A n jn 1 is an integer and A 1 ; : : :; A n 2 B L and 81 i; j n; i 6 = j ) A i 6 = A j g 2 Thus, conj(B L ) and disj(B L ) denote, respectively, the set of all ground conjunctions and disjunctions formed by using distinct atoms in B L . A conjunction or disjunction with repeated atoms is considered equivalent to one without repeated atoms, by simply deleting the repetitions. 2 Intuitively, if = ; ], then F : is to be read as: \The probability of F lies in the interval ; ]". Thus, to say that event F cannot occur, we merely say F : 0; 0] which is read as: \ the probability of event F occurring lies in the interval 0; 0]" which is the same as saying \the probability of event F is zero".
De nition 5 A probabilistic logic program (p-program for short) is a nite set of p-clauses. 2 We say that A : is uni able with B : 0 via i A and B are uni able via some substitution P(E 1 ) and P(E 2 ). But we can characterize precisely the range within which the probability of (E 1^E2 ) must lie. As Frechet 21] has shown, maxf0; P(E 1 ) + P(E 2 ) ? 1g P(E 1^E2 ) minfP(E 1 ); P(E 2 )g represents the tightest bounds for P(E 1^E2 ). This result can be generalized as shown below. In the sequel, a world is simply an Herbrand interpretation as de ned in Lloyd 36] . Given the two events, there are four possible worlds: rst (world K 1 ), in which the events E 1 and E 2 both occur; second (world K 2 ) in which E 1 occurs, but E 2 does not occur; third (world K 3 ) in which E 2 occurs while E 1 does not occur; and lastly (world K 4 ) in which neither E 1 nor E 2 occur. Suppose P(E 1 ) 2 1 ; 1 ] 0; 1] and P(E 2 ) 2 2 ; 2 ] 0; 1]. Furthermore, let k i be the probability that world K i is the actual world. This situation can be expressed via the following linear program Q: As event E 1 occurs in worlds K 1 and K 2 which are mutually incompatible worlds, the probability of E 1 occurring is (k 1 + k 2 ). As P(E 1 ) is known to be in 1 ; 1 ], this gives rise to the rst inequality in the linear program Q. The second inequality arises similarly when we consider E 2 instead of E 1 . The third inequality says that the four possible worlds encompass all possibilities.
The fourth inequality simply asserts that probabilities are non-negative.
To nd the range for P(E 1^E2 ), we need to solve the linear program Q for the parameter k 1 that represents the probability of the world in which E 1 and E 2 are both true. However, in general, there is no unique solution. Thus, we need to solve Q to nd the minimal and maximal values of k 1 . Likewise, to nd the range for P(E 1 _ E 2 ), we solve for the minimal and maximal values of (k 1 + k 2 + k 3 ). Hereafter we use the notation min Q E and max Q E to denote the minimization and maximization of expression E subject to the linear program Q described above. Secondly, for any solution to the linear program, it satis es the constraint k 1 0. Therefore, it follows that min Q k 1 = 0 = maxf0; 1 + 2 ? 1g. It is then easy to see that k 4 plays the role of k 1 in Q. Hence, it follows from ii) that max Q k 4 = minf1 ? 1 ; 1 ? 2 g. Thus, it is easy to check that min Q (k 1 + k 2 + k 3 ) = 1 ? max Q k 4 = maxf 1 ; 2 g. iv) Claim:-max Q (k 1 + k 2 + k 3 ) = minf1; 1 + 2 g.
The proof is similar to that of case iii). This completes the proof of the theorem. The following lemma shows a few properties of and that will be used in later proofs. Recall that p-programs allow non-atomic basic formulas to appear in the body but not in the head of p-clauses. As formalized in the following de nition, a formula function determines assignments of probability ranges to non-atomic formulas by applying the operators and on the probability ranges assigned to atomic formulas. V : : : V F n : n is a ground instance of a clause in P and 8i; 1 i n; h(F i ) i g: If the set M A is empty, then T P (h)(A) = 0; 1]. ii) T P (h)(C 1^C2 ) = T P (h)(C 1 ) T P (h)(C 2 ), where (C 1^C2 ) is in bf(B L ), and
In the following we prove that T P is monotonic.
De nition 12 Let Proof Given a basic formula F, proceed by induction on rank(F) and apply part 3 of Lemma 1.
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De nition 13 The upward iteration of T P is de ned as follows: i) T P " 0 = ?, i.e. T P " 0 is the function that assigns 0; 1] to all F 2 bf(B L ) and ii) T P " = T P (T P " ( ? 1)) where is a successor ordinal whose immediate predecessor is denoted by ( ? 1) and iii) T P " = tfT P " j < g, where is a limit ordinal. . Therefore, it follows that t(T P (g j )(q)) = 0; 1] 6 = T P (tG)(q).
To prove Lemma 4, we prove the following lemma rst.
Lemma 3 For all F 2 bf(B L ), T P " !(F) = ) 9n < ! such that T P " n(F) = .
Proof Proceed by induction on rank(F).
Base Case: rank(F) = 1
Then F A for some atom A. Suppose T P " !(A) 6 = T P " n(A) for all n < !. Since T P " 0(A) T P " 1(A) : : : T P " !(A), there exists an ascending sequence of integers 0 ; 1 ; : : : such that T P " 0 (A) T P " 1 (A) : : :. In particular, since T P " !(A) = tfT P " n(A)jn < !g, and T P " !(A) 6 = T P " n(A) for all n < !, the sequence 0 ; 1 ; : : : must be in nite. But for each j in the sequence, T P " j (A) = tX j , where X j A = f j is the annotation of the head of a clause which uni es with Ag. Therefore, there exists a corresponding in nite sequence X 0 ; X 1 ; : : : of subsets of A such that X 0 X 1 : : :. However since program P consists of only a nite set of clauses, A and therefore the number of subsets of A must both be nite. Therefore, there exists i < j such that X i = X j , a contradiction! Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1 Then, F is either a conjunction or a disjunction. Case 1: F C 1^C2
By De nition 11, T P " !(F) = T P " !(C 1^C2 ) = T P " !(C 1 ) T P " !(C 2 ). But by the induction hypothesis, there exists n 1 < ! such that T P " n 1 (C 1 ) = T P " !(C 1 ), and n 2 < ! such that T P " n 2 (C 2 ) = T P " !(C 2 ). Pick n = maxfn 1 ; n 2 g < !. Then, it follows that T P " n(F) = T P " n(C 1 ) T P " n(C 2 ) = T P " !(C 1 ) T P " !(C 2 ) = T P " !(F).
The proof is similar to the one for conjunctions in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma.
2 Despite the fact that T P is not always continuous, the following result holds.
Lemma 4 There exists an integer n < ! such that T P " n = lfp(T P ).
Proof Immediate consequence of the lemma above and the fact that bf(B L ) is nite.
2 Lemma 4 tells us that the T P operator always achieves a xpoint after a nite iteration.
Probabilistic Model Theory
In this section, we present a model theory that captures the uncertainty described in p-programs. We introduce notions such as probabilistic truth values of formulas and probabilistic interpretations and models for p-programs. We also study the relationships between formula functions and probabilistic interpretations, and between xpoints of T P and probabilistic models for P. Intuitively, probabilistic kernel interpretations assume that the \real" world is de nite, i.e. there is some set of propositions that are true, and some set of propositions that are false. However, it is not sure which of the various \possible worlds" (i.e. worlds are just 2-valued interpretations) is the right one. Hence, a kernel interpretation assigns a probability to each 2-valued interpretation of our language. As 2 B L consists of all possible worlds, it must be the case that the sum of all probabilities assigned be 1. Any two distinct worlds are mutually incompatible as they must di er on at least one atom. Hence, we can compute the probability of a formula F in a kernel interpretation KI by just summing up the probabilities assigned to those worlds in 2 B L in which F is true. Note on Notation. Throughout this paper, given a kernel interpretation KI, we will use K 1 ; : : :; K n to denote the elements of 2 B L and k 1 ; : : :; k n to denote KI(K 1 ); : : :; KI(K n ) respectively.
Example 3 Suppose L consists of two propositional symbols p and q. Then KI(f;g) = 0:4, KI(fpg) = 0:25, KI(fqg) = 0:35, KI(fp; qg) = 0 is a probabilistic kernel interpretation. Intuitively, KI says that the probability that both p and q are false is 0:4, the probability that p is true in our real world, but q is false is 0:25, the probability that q is true in the real world but p is false is 0:35, and the probability that both p and q are true in the real world is 0. 2
Recall from the previous section that a formula function h speci es a probability range for each basic formula. Given h, we would like to nd those kernel interpretations whose probability assignments to basic formulas fall within the ranges speci ed by h. 
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Note that in the above linear program, the K j 's are 2-valued interpretations and the F i 's are basic formulas. All basic formulas are formulas of classical logic. Hence, the expression K j j = F is to be read: \K j satis es F" where satisfaction is de ned as in classical logic 8, 47] . Notice that every solution to LP (h) is a kernel interpretation that satis es h. Hence, we use the notation KI (h) to denote the family of kernel interpretations that satisfy h.
Also note that each basic formula in our language generates an inequality in the above linear program. If function symbols are allowed in our language, then bf(B L ) will be in nite and the linear program will have in nitely many constraints and k j 's. As far as we know, current technology on the theory of linear programming in in nite dimensional space 1] can only deal with semi-in nite linear programs which either have in nitely many variables (k j 's in our case) or in nitely many constraints, but not both. This is the technical reason why function symbols are disallowed in our framework. In the remainder of this section, we study the relationship between a kernel interpretation and a probabilistic interpretation, and more importantly the relationship between xpoints and probabilistic models. While we will discuss in detail all these notions and relationships very shortly, we rst examine when a family of kernel interpretations is non-empty.
Consider the atomic function f associated, as per De nition 8, with a given formula function h. As de ned in De nition 8, for all A 2 B L ; f(A) = h(A). In the following, we show that the family of kernel interpretations for a formula function h is the same as the family for the atomic function f associated with h, that is KI (h) = KI (f). The reason is that the constraints in LP (h) for non-atomic formulas are redundant and can therefore be discarded without altering the solution set to the linear program. These constraints are redundant because, as we recall from the previous section, probability ranges are propagated to non-atomic formulas through repeated applications of and on the ranges assigned to atoms. Hence, in nding solutions to the entire set of constraints, it su ces to consider constraints for the atoms only. In particular, Lemma 5 below states that in the presence of the constraints for C 1 ; C 2 2 conj(B L ), the constraint for C 1^C2 can be ignored. Inductive case: rank(F) > 1 Then F is either a conjunction or a disjunction. Case 1: F C 1^C2 >From De nition 8, h(F) = h(C 1 ) h(C 2 ). >From the induction hypothesis, ; h(C 1 ) and ; h(C 2 ). Then it follows immediately from Lemma 1 that ; = ; ; h(C 1 ) h(C 2 ). This completes the proof for case 1.
We are now in a position to characterize formula functions whose family of kernel interpretations are non-empty. Theorem 4 tells us that if a formula function h is fully-de ned, then the set LP (h) of inequalities is guaranteed to possess at least one solution. In addition, k 1 ; : : :; k 2 n?1 +2 n?2 0, and k 1 + : : : + k 2 n?1 +2 n?2 = 2 :
iii) Continue this process one inequality at a time. Finally when the last inequality is considered, set k 2 n ?1 = n ? n?1 . Then, 2 n?1 X j=1 k 2j?1 = n , satisfying the last inequality as n n . In addition, k 1 ; : : :; k 2 n ?1 0, and k 1 + : : : + k 2 n ?1 = n : iv) Finally, to satisfy the condition that all k j 's add up to 1, set k 2 n = 1 ? n 0: Thus whenever f is fully-de ned, KI (f) is non-empty. Fenstad 16] has identi ed the following requirements for de ning a probability function p on a rst-order langauge L:
iii) p( ) = p( ), if and are logically equivalent in L, and
It is obvious from the above lemma that probabilistic interpretations satisfy the last three requirements of Fenstad. The following lemma shows that probabilistic interpretations also satisfy the rst requirement. The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 8 Let and be arbitrary formulas in language L. Suppose that KI is a probabilistic kernel interpretation and that I is the probabilistic interpretation associated with KI. Then I( _ ) + I( ^ ) = I( ) + I( ).
Recall that for every formula function h, there is a corresponding family of kernel interpretations KI (h). And as de ned above, for each of these kernel interpretations, there is a corresponding probabilistic interpretation I. Therefore, associated with h is a family of probabilistic interpretations, denoted by I (h).
De nition 18 Suppose KI is a probabilistic kernel interpretation, and I is the probabilistic interpretation associated with KI. Also let F be a basic formula and F 0 ; : : :; Note that I j = F : de nes a satisfaction relation, that is a probabilistic interpretation I either satis es F : or not; I does not try to calculate the probability range for F. As usual, we use the notation j = also to denote logical consequence. We say program P logically entails formula F, denoted P j = F i whenever I is a probabilistic interpretation that satis es each clause in P, then I j = F. We now investigate the relationship between xpoints and probabilistic models of a p-program. Lemma 9 below is necessary to prove Theorem 5.
Lemma 9 Suppose h is a fully de ned formula function. Then for all F 2 bf(B L ), h(F) = ; ] is the smallest interval that contains fI(F)jI 2 I (h)g which is the set of probabilistic truth values of F assigned by the family of probabilistic interpretations associated with h. The proof is similar to the one for conjunction in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma.
2 The Lemma says that h(F) is the smallest interval that contains the set of all the probabilistic truth values of F assigned by the family of probabilistic interpretations associated with h. It is useful in proving the following theorem which states that all fully-de ned pre-xpoints of T P generates a non-empty family of probabilistic models for P.
Theorem 5 Suppose a formula function h is fully-de ned. Then I (h) is a family of probabilistic models of P i T P (h) h.
Proof i) Claim:-If h is fully-de ned, and I (h) is a family of probabilistic models, then T P (h) h. Let V : : : V F n : n is a ground instance of a clause in P and 8i; 1 i n; h(F i ) i g. Let C be any clause described in the set above. Then, for all I 2 I (f), I(A) 2 , where is the p-annotation in the head of C. Therefore, I(A) 2 T P (h)(A). Thus, T P (h)(A) contains fI(A)jI 2 I (f)g. But by Lemma 9, f(A) is the smallest interval that contains fI(A)jI 2 I (f)g. Therefore, h(A) = f(A) T P (h)(A).
Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1 Then, F is either a conjunction or a disjunction. Case 1: F C 1^C2 By the induction hypothesis, h(C 1 ) T P (h)(C 1 ) and h(C 2 ) T P (h)(C 2 ). But by Lemma 1, h(C 1^C2 ) = h(C 1 ) h(C 2 ) T P (h)(C 1 ) T P (h)(C 2 ) = T P (h)(C 1^C2 ).
The proof is similar to the one for conjunctions in case 1. This completes the proof of i).
ii) Claim:-If h is fully-de ned, and T P (h) h, then I (h) is a family of probabilistic models. For all I 2 I (h), let A : F 1 : 1 V : : : V F n : n be a ground instance of a clause in P, and I(F i ) 2 i ; for all 1 i n. But by Lemma 9, h(F i ) is the smallest interval that contains fI(F i )jI 2 I (h)g. Therefore, h(F i ) i ; for all 1 i n. Recall that T P (h)(A) = T f jA : F 1 : 1 V : : : V F n : n is a ground instance of a clause in P and 8i; 1 i n; h(F i ) i g. Corollary 2 Suppose the least xpoint of T P is fully-de ned. Then since T P is monotonic, it is the case that: I(lfp(T P )) = fI(f) j T P (f) f g.
According to the two corollaries above, if the least xpoint of T P is fully-de ned, then it generates a non-empty family of probabilistic models for P. Moreover, this family contains the family associated with each pre-xpoint of T P . As T P is a monotone operator on a complete lattice, it is guaranteed to possess at least one xpoint (and hence there is at least one h such that T P (h) h). However, it is possible that there is no formula function h that satis es each of the conditions below:
T P (h) h and h is fully-de ned. Here, for all h 2 FF, T P (h)(q) = ;, and hence h T P (h) for all h 2 FF. Thus, there is only one atomic function h such that T P (h) h, and this is the function, denoted by h 0 , which assigns ; to q, i.e. h 0 (q) = ;. Clearly, T P (h 0 ) = h 0 . But h 0 is clearly not fully de ned. For such a program P and such an h 0 , I(h) = ;. In the following, we characterize p-programs whose least xpoints are fully-de ned.
De nition 19 A p-program P is inconsistent i it has no probabilistic model.
We now relate probabilistic inconsistency with the notion of full-de nedness.
Lemma 11 Suppose I is a probabilistic model of the p-program P. Then for all F 2 bf(B L ), if T P " n(F) , it is necessary that I j = F : for all n 0.
Proof Prove by induction on n.
The following theorem demonstrates that there is a close relationship between consistency of probabilistic logic programs and the full-de nedness of the least xpoint of the operator associated with the program.
Theorem 6 A p-program P is inconsistent i lfp(T P ) is not fully-de ned. However, in the probabilistic framework, programs need not possess models, and inconsistent theories entail all formulas. Thus, the system proposed here is not paraconsistent.
Solvability of sets of linear equations has been widely studied (cf. 28, 35] ). In our work, linear programs are only used as a tool enabling the model-theoretic study of probabilistic logic programming. As such, we do not address deeper issues in linear programming in this paper.
Proof Procedure
In this section, we show how we may process queries to p-programs.
De nition 20 is a uni er of annotated conjunctions C 1 (A 1^: : :^A n ) : 1 Proof Here we only show the conjunction case, as the disjunction case is similar. In particular, we show that given C 1 (A 1^: : :^A n ) : 1 and C 2 (B 1^: : :^B m ) : 2 , if C 1 and C 2 are uni able, then there exists a max-gu of C 1 and C 2 . Informally, the proof proceeds as follows. If is a uni er of C 1 and C 2 , then for each A i , 1 i n, there must be a B (i) , 1 (i) m such that A i = B (i) . Conversely, for each 1 j m, there exists a (j), 1 (j) n such that B j = A (j) . Thus, informally, when is applied to C 1 and C 2 , there is a suitable \match" between the A i 's and the B j 's. We may observe, informally, that C 1 and C 2 are uni able i there is a solvable set of equations of the form: Intuitively, as the A ik 's and the B jk 's are arguments of the atoms of the conjunctions, the equations de ned above can be viewed as the constraints which the uni cation must satisfy. The proof of the lemma then consists of 4 parts. i) Claim:-There are nitely many sets that satisfy the conditions above.
Since all the equations are of the form A ik = B jl for some i; k; j; l such that 1 i n, 1 j m, 1 k a i , 1 l b j , there are at most nL mL = nmL 2 distinct equations where L = max(fa i j1 i ng S fb j j1 j mg). Thus there are at most 2 nmL 2 sets that satisfy the conditions above. Now let S 1 ; : : :; S u be all such sets of equations which have solutions. The following shows that since C 1 and C 2 are uni able, u 1. ii) Claim:-Any uni er of C 1 and C 2 is a solution to some set of equations de ned above. Recall that S 1 ; : : :; S u are the sets of equations that have solutions. From ii) and iii), it is proved that solutions to S 1 ; : : :; S u correspond to all the uni ers of C 1 and C 2 . Now for 1 i u, as S i is solvable, it follows by the result of Martelli and Montanari 38] that each S i has an mgu i . Moreover, i is unique in the sense that if i is also an mgu of S i , then i i , i.e. i ] = i ].
As we need to consider only nitely many such i 's, it follows that f 1 ]; : : :; u ]g contain a maximal element (again not necessarily unique) wrt the ordering. This maximal element is a max-gu of C 1 and C 2 .
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The proof of the above Lemma yields an algorithm to compute max-gu's (or determine their non-existence). We believe that more e cient algorithms exist, but the study of such algorithms is beyond the scope of this paper. Once again, the main reason that we distinguish between max-gu's and ordinary mgu's is that the former are not always unique. In the remainder of this section, we present a proof procedure for p-programs. As this procedure operates on the compiled version of p-programs, we rst formalize the compilation process.
De nition 24 Given a p-program P, de ne REDUN(P) = P S fA 2) The closure of a p-program P, denoted by CL(P), is the p-program constructed by repeatedly adding to P all the clauses R C 1 ;C 2 obtained from distinct p-clauses C 1 and C 2 in P whose heads are uni able.
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Note that in generating the closure of a p-program, unlike the treatment in 5, 6] , it is su cient only to consider pairs of distinct clauses in P, instead of triplets, quadruplets and so on. Suppose there is a clause R C 1 ;:::;Cn that is generated from clauses C 1 ; : : :; C n in the way de ned above, where n 2. But observe that for n 2 We now show that the clauses added to P to construct NF(P) are logical consequences of P, and hence, they do not change the meaning of P. The addition of such clauses is to ensure that the truth value assigned to any basic formula depends on a single clause, rather than a group of such clauses.
Lemma 13 For every clause C 2 NF(P), P j = C.
Proof Case 1: C 2 P Then if I is a probabilistic model of P, I must be a probabilistic model of C. Therefore, P j = C. We now present a refutation procedure for query processing.
De nition 27 A query is a formula of the form 9( De nition 29 An SLDp-deduction of the initial query Q 1 9(F 1 : 1 V : : : V F n : n ) from a p-program P is a sequence hQ 1 ; C 1 ; 1 i; : : :; hQ r ; C r ; r i; : : :, where for all i 1, C i is a renamed version of a clause in NF(P) and Q i+1 is an SLDp-resolvent of Q i and C i via an max-gu i .
If the i 's are not restricted to be max-gu's, then the sequence is called an unrestricted SLDpdeduction.
De nition 30 An SLDp-refutation of the initial query Q 1 9(F 1 : 1 V : : : V F n : n ) from a pprogram P is a nite SLDp-deduction hQ 1 ; C 1 ; 1 i; : : :; hQ n ; C n ; n i, where the SLDp-resolvent of Q n and C n via max-gu n is the empty query. 1 : : : n is called the computed answer substitution.
If the i 's are not restricted to be max-gu's, then the deduction is called an unrestricted SLDprefutation.
We now demonstrate that SLDp-refutation is always sound. Hereafter, given a query Q 9(F 1 : 1 V : : : V F n : n ) and a substitution , we abuse the notation 8(Q ) to denote 8( 2 Lemma 16 below requires that P is a consistent p-program.
Lemma 16 1) Let P be a consistent p-program, and C 1 ; C 2 2 conj(B L ). Suppose P j = (C 1Ĉ
2 ) : . Then P j = C 1 : 1 and P j = C 2 : 2 for some 1 ; 2 such that Proof Since P is consistent, then for every probabilistic model I of P, I(C 1^C2 ) 2 . Recall from Corollary 2 that the family of probabilistic models corresponding to the least xpoint contains all probabilistic models for P. Hence, it follows from Lemma 9 that lfp(T P )(C 1^C2 ) . But lfp(T P )(C 1^C2 ) = lfp(T P )(C 1 ) lfp(T P )(C 2 ). Let 1 and 2 be lfp(T P )(C 1 ) and lfp(T P )(C 2 ) respectively. In other words, 1 2 . Again by Lemma 9, for every probabilistic model I of P, I(C 1 ) 2 1 and I(C 2 ) 2 2 . Therefore, P j = C 1 : 1 and P j = C 2 : 2 . This completes the proof of 1). The proof of 2) is similar.
Lemma 17 Let P be a p-program, F be a basic formula (not necessarily ground), and 0; 1].
Then P j = 9(F : ) ) P j = F : for some ground instance F of F.
Proof Proceed by induction on rank(F). But according to Lemma 9, all ranges computed by h are the tightest possible ranges. This is because, as shown in the proof of Lemma 9, probabilistic interpretations can always be constructed to take on the upper or lower bounds of ranges computed by h for all basic formulas.
Then from the induction hypothesis, there exist probabilistic models that satisfy the following inequalities:
for all 1 i k; l i I(C i ) u i for all 1 i k; l i I(D i ) u i .
In particular, there are models that take on the upper and lower bounds of the inequalities.
Thus according to Theorem 1, these models satisfy system Q above. However since for all But according to Lemma 9, all ranges computed by h are the tightest possible ranges. This is because, as shown in the proof of Lemma 9, probabilistic models can always be constructed to take on the upper or lower bounds of ranges computed by h for all basic formulas. In particular, there exist models I of P such that I(F i j ) takes on the values either l ij or u ij , for all 1 j m and some 1 i n dependent on j. Therefore, there exists a model I of P such that I(F i j ) 6 2 i for all 1 j m and some 1 i n dependent on j. Thus, for all 1 j m, I 6 j = F 1 j : 1 V : : : V F n j : n , which contradicts the assumption that P j = 9Q! be the probabilistic kernel interpretation that assigns 1 3 to each of the worlds K 1 = fp(a); p(b)g, K 2 = fp(a)g, K 3 = fp(b)g and 0 to K 4 = ;. Let I be the probabilistic interpretation associated with KI. Then I is a probabilistic model of P, but I assigns 2 3 to each of p(a); p(b). Thus, I 6 j = (9x)(p(x) : 1; 1])). However, I assigns 1 to (9x)p(x). This is probabilistically correct because, in general, the probabilistic statement P((9x)q(x)) = is not equivalent to the (metalinguistic) statement (9x)(P(q(x)) = ).
Lemma 19 Let P be a consistent p-program, F be a basic formula, and be a substitution. The proof is similar to the one for conjunctions in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma.
We now demonstrate that SLDp-resolution is complete when we consider consistent p-programs.
Theorem 8 (Completeness of SLDp-refutation) Let P be a consistent p-program and Q be a query. Then if P j = Q, there exists an SLDp-refutation of Q from P.
Proof Let Q 9(F 1 : 1 V : : : V F m : m ). Then by Lemma 18,  there is a such that Q is ground and P j = (Q ). Therefore, for all 1 j m, P j = (F j : j ), where F j is ground. Now pick j = maxf j i j1 i n j g. Since T P is monotonic, T P " j (A j i ) i , for all 1 i n j . Since is monotonic, then for all 1 j m, T P " j (F j ) = T P " j (A j 1 ) : : : T P " j (A j n j ) 1 : : : n j j . Case 2: F j A j 1 _ : : : _ A j n j Then by Lemma 16, for all 1 i n j , P j = (A j i : i ) for some i such that 1 : : : n j j .
Therefore, lfp(T P )(A j i ) i . Thus, there exists an integer j i < ! such that T P " j i (A j i ) i . Now pick j = maxf j i j1 i n j g. Since T P is monotonic, T P " j (A j i ) i , for all 1 i n j . Since is monotonic, then for all 1 j m, T P " j (F j ) = T P " j (A j 1 ) : : : T P " j (A j n j ) 1 : : : n j j . Therefore, by combining cases 1 and 2 above, it follows that for all basic formulas F 1 ; : : :; F m , there exists an integer j such that T P " j (F j ) j , for 1 j m. Now pick = maxf j j1 j mg. Since T P is monotonic, T P " (F j ) j , for all 1 j m. Now we proceed by induction on to prove that there exists an SLDp-refutation of F j for all 1 j m. It is easy to verify that lfp(T P ) = T P " 2, which is the following formula function: T P " 2(p(a)) = 1; 1]; T P " 2(q(a)) = 1; 1]; T P " 2(p(a)^q(a)) = 1; 1]; T P " 2(p(a)_q(a)) = 1; 1]. Then LP (lfp(T P )) is the following system of constraints: 
The following result is easy to prove.
Proposition 1 Suppose P is any classical logic program (cf. Lloyd 36] 
In general, our approach to representing probabilistic information is a subjectivistic view, while Bacchus' 2] approach uses an explicitly empirical representation of probabilities. However, as noted by Bacchus 2, p.19{20], \the possible worlds approach, which expresses a subjective probability, can assign a probability to a closed formula, but is incapable of representing empirical probabilities". On the other hand, Bacchus' system \is incapable of representing a subjective probability assignment to a closed formula", 2, p.20]. In addition, it is not clear how to use Bacchus' system as a basis for logic programming.
Note that the program in Example 14 can also be represented in the framework of Blair and Subrahmanian 5] and Kifer and Subrahmanian 32] . According to their semantics which is paraconsistent, this program has a model. This program also shows that when intervals are considered to be truth values (as is possible in 5, 32]), the resulting semantics is di erent from the probabilistic semantics.
The integration of logic and probability theory has been the subject of numerous studies 7, 9, 24, 37, 42, 13, 14, 41, 45] . Here, we only compare our work with those that are directly related to our e orts. Nilsson 41] has given an informal operational account for integrating probabilities into logic. His framework lacks a model theory. . However, there seem to be a number of connections between our work and theirs; in particular, it would be interesting to see if their measure-theoretic approach could be used to develop a foundation for probabilistic logic programming, with inner measures serving as lower probability bounds, and outer measures serving as upper bounds for probabilities. We are currently studying this topic. In a related context, Kyburg 34] has used a complex metalanguage that includes ZF set theory to express statistical information. Our proposal achieves similar goals within a rst order framework. It is not clear how Kyburg's proposal may be used as the basis for a programming language (it was not intended for that).
The well-known Dempster Shafer theory of evidence 13, 45] does not seem to t into our framework in any immediate way. There is some controversy, at present, on the epistemological basis for Dempster Shafer theory. For instance, Cheeseman 10] argues that the theory of Dempster Shafer belief functions is ad-hoc and non-probabilistic (cf. also Shafer 45] Shafer theory and probability theory. We avoid this controversy and note that a great deal of work still needs to be done in the development of a model-theoretic foundation for Dempster Shafer theory. Fitting 19] observes that developing quantitative logic programming languages based on Dempster Shafer theory is still an open problem. Bandler and Kohout 4] suggest an interval valued representation of multivalued logical operations. Their framework is based on fuzzy set theory, and they compute the lower and upper bounds of an interval with the use of min-max and product-sum. Fuzzy set theory 52, 53] which also plays an important role in uncertain reasoning is well known to possess non-probabilistic features and hence we do not discuss it in greater detail here.
In logic programming, most work on quantitative deduction has focused on non-probabilistic logic programming. We feel that one reason for this has been because the relationship between logic and probability theory has been elusive. The frameworks of Blair and Subrahmanian 6] have dealt with lattice-based logic programming. A similar comment applies to the work of Fitting who interprets conjunction and disjunction as GLB and LUB, respectively, in the lattice. However, probabilities do not respect this interpretation (e.g. the probability of a disjunction may be much greater than the LUB of the probabilities of the individual disjuncts). van Emden 51] develops a quantitative logic programming language in which multiplication is used to assign truth values to conjunctions. Of course, probabilities can be multiplied only if the events are independent, and hence van Emden's framework is also non-probabilistic. Baldwin 3] develops an operational model for evidential logic programming which is based on fuzzy set theory, and there is no immediately forthcoming model-theoretic basis for his work.
Our framework has its limitations. In particular, there is no provision made for expressing conditional probabilities. In addition, we assume that programs are function free. This assumption was found to be necessary because we would like the set of inequalities determined by an atomic function to be nite. When function symbols are allowed, each ground atom (of which there may be an in nite number) determines an inequality, and hence we may have an in nite number of such inequalities. Solving an in nite set of inequations requires some di erent techniques. In a related context, Keisler 26] has shown that even nite logics with -additive probability distributions (cf. Halmos 25] ) over the domain of an interpretation are not compact. We are currently working on this problem.
Conclusions
Thus far, quantitative logic programming languages 51, 18, 19, 5, 48, 49] have been unable to deal with probabilistic information. As probabilistic and statistical information is widely used in everyday decision-making, it is essential that logic programs have the ability to represent probabilistic information. We have proposed, in this paper, a probabilistic framework for logic programming. We have developed a probabilistic model theory and showed various connections between families of probabilistic models and the xpoints of an operator associated with the program. Our probabilistic model theory satis es the four properties that Fenstad 16] states as desiderata for a function to be considered probabilistic. In addition, we have developed a sound and complete proof procedure for such languages. To our knowledge, this is the rst probabilistic semantics for quantitative logic programming.
In ongoing research, we show how this framework can be used to reason about queueing systems and for developing logic operating systems. The latter is greatly facilitated by the fact that mutual exclusion of events E 1 ; E 2 can be expressed as (E 1^E2 ) : 0; 0] even though the individual probabilities of events E 1 and E 2 may be non-zero. We also study the support of variables in annotations and non-monotonic negation.
